A Strategic Framework Describing The
           Eight Stages of Successful Social Movements

                   By Bill Moyer, Spring 1987

The United States anti-nuclear energy movement was launched in
the Spring of 1977, when 1,414 Clamshell Alliance activists
occupied the Seabrook nuclear power site and spent the next 12
days in jail.  During those two weeks, nuclear energy became a
worldwide public issue as the mass media spotlight focused on the
activists locked in armories throughout New Hampshire.  Support
demonstrations popped up across the United States, and in the
following months hundreds of new grassroots anti-nuclear energy
direct action groups started.

The Clamshell Alliance was considered a proto-type of the new
movement.  Activists throughout the country idealized the
accomplishments of the Clamshell activists.  They had created a
new nationwide uprising against nuclear energy, the powerful
nuclear energy industry, and the national government's goal (set
by "Operation Independence") of 1,000 nuclear power plants by the
turn of the century.  Until then nuclear power had the public's
approval and had not been a social issue.  We wondered how  on
Earth they did it.  I eagerly looked forward to attending the
strategy conference in February, 1978, with 45 Clamshell
organizers from around New England.

That Friday night, I expected to meet a spirited, upbeat group
that was proud of its accomplishments.  I was shocked when the
Clamshell activists arrived with heads bowed, dispirited, and
depressed, saying their efforts had been in vain.  After two
years of hard effort, the Seabrook nuclear power plant was still
being constructed, and Operation Independence was still going
forward.  Some people reported massive burnout and dropout;
others spoke of the need for increased militant action, even
violent guerilla actions.  None believed they could rally even a
fraction of the thousands of people they thought would be
necessary to stop nuclear energy through the upcoming civil
disobedience blockade at Seabrook in the Spring.

I wondered how I could convince these activists, in my scheduled
talk the next morning, that they were extremely successful and
considered national heroes by many in the new movement.  I stayed
up most of that night creating a model framework (now called
"MAP") that describes stages that successful social movements go
through.  I presented the model the next morning, explaining how,
led by Clamshell, a new movement was created; how in one year it
had achieved most of the goals of stage four; and how it was
about to move the next stage--majority opposition.  The stages
framework helped empower many of the Clamshell activists and
helped them create a new strategy.

The Clamshell experience of discouragement and collapse is far
from unusual.  Within a few years after achieving the goals of
"take-off", every major social movement of the past twenty years
has undergone a significant collapse, in which activists believed
that their movements had failed, the power institutions were too
powerful, and their own efforts were futile.  This has happened
even when movements were actually progressing reasonably well
along the normal path taken by past successful movements!

The Movement Action Plan (MAP) was first published as the Fall
1986 edition of the Dandelion.  Twelve-thousand copies were
published and distributed.  This is a revised edition of that
article.  People are invited to participate in the continuing
development of MAP and help spread it to local groups.


About This Issue

The Second edition of the Movement Action Plan is an expanded and
updated version of the Fall 1986 Dandelion.  It includes
suggestions from readers of the first edition and attenders of
the MAP workshops, and has grown from eight to sixteen pages in
length.  Please sent your feedback--affirmations, criticisms,
ideas, and references.

This edition was produced by Jeff Aiken, Sharon Kocher, Bill
Moyer, and Sean Stryker.  Editing and productions coordinated by
Sean Stryker, Green Alternative Information for Action (GAIA).

About the Author

Bill Moyer has been an organizer, writer, trainer, and strategist
with a wide range of social movements for over 25 years.  His
experience includes work with the civil rights, anti-Vietnam War,
anti-nuclear energy and weapons, European nuclear disarmament,
and non-intervention in Central America movements.  He was staff
with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference's Poor Peoples' Campaign, director of the
American Friends Service Committee's Chicago open housing
program, national nonviolence trainer, and co-founder of the
Movement For a New Society and its Philadelphia Life Center. 
Currently Bill is the National Project Coordinator of the Social
Movement Empowerment Project. 

The Social Movement Empowerment Project

The Social Movement Empowerment Project is a technical assistance
program that is developing the Movement Action Plan and
educating activists to use it.  The goal is to have activists in
a wide variety of movements apply MAP to their own organizing and
strategizing.  SMEP has a local Board of Directory, a National
Advisory Group, a full-time Project Coordinator, and support
volunteers across the country.

The Social Movement Empowerment Project is carrying out the
following programs:

(1)  Develop, publish, and distribute MAP publications.  There
     were 12,000 copies of the Fall 1986 MAP Dandelion published
     and sold, and 12,000 additional copies of this second MAP
     tabloid edition have been published.  Additional upcoming
     publications include a MAP wall poster, a book (1988), and
     training materials.

(2)  Train activists to understand and use MAP.  The Project
     Coordinator is holding MAP trainings and presentations in
     five regions of the country.

(3)  Train activist-trainers to teach others to understand and
     use MAP.  Beginning in late 1987, several pilot training for
     trainers workshops will be held in several regions. 
     Training for trainers will be held in five different regions
     in 1988, and there will be a national MAP trainer gathering.

Please let the SMEP office know if you are interested in helping
the program by distributing materials, setting up or attending
trainings, giving a financial contribution, or assisting with

The Social Movement Empowerment Project has received financial
support from the A.J. Muste Memorial Institute, New Society
Educations Foundation, Funding Exchange/National Community Funds,
as well as a number of individuals.  

The Movement for a New Society

The Dandelion is published four times a year by the Movement For
A New Society.  MNS is committed to feminist, nonviolent social
change and has members and affiliates in 19 states and five other
countries.  MNS members work to build more effective social
movements through organizing, networking, coalition building,
training, and developing analysis, vision, and strategy for
social movements.  For more information, write to MNS, P.O. Box
1922, Cambridge, MA 02238.

                        SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movements are collective actions in which the populace is
alerted, educated, and mobilized, over years and decades, to
challenge the powerholders and the whole society to redress
social problems or grievances and restore critical social values. 
By involving the populace directly in the political process,
social movements also foster the concept of government of, by,
and for the people.  The power of movements is directly
proportional to the forcefulness with which the grassroots exert
their discontent and demand change.

The central issue of social movements, therefore, is the struggle
between the movement and the powerholders to win the hearts
(sympathies), minds (public opinion), and active support of the
great majority of the populace, which ultimately holds the power
to either preserve the status quo or create change.

There needs to  be a revival of democracy through "people power". 
The increasingly centralized power of the state and other social
institutions, combined with the new use of the mass media to
carry out the political process, has all but eliminated effective
citizen participation in the decision-making process. 
Centralized powerholders now make decisions in the interests of a
small minority, while simultaneously undermining the common good
and aggravating critical social problems.

But people are powerful.  Power ultimately resides with the
populace.  History is full of examples of an inspired citizenry
involved in social movements that achieve social and political
changes--even topple tyrannical governments.  Powerholders know
this.  They know that their power depends on the support or
acquiescence of the mass population.

Nonviolent social movements are a powerful means for preserving
democracy and making societies address critical social problems. 
They enable citizens to challenge the prevailing centers of power
and become active in society's decision-making process,
especially at times when the normal channels for their political
participation are ineffective.  Social movements mobilize
citizens and public opinion to challenge powerholders and the
whole society to adhere to universal values and sensibilities and
redress social problems.  At their best, they create an empowered
citizenry, shifting the locus of social and political power from
central elites and institutions to new grassroots networks and
groups.  In recent years, social movements have helped establish
many civil rights for Blacks and women, end the Vietnam War, curb
U.S. military interventions, and topple dictators in Haiti and
the Philippines.  Presently, there are strong movements opposing
nuclear weapons, nuclear power, South African apartheid, and U.S.
intervention in Central America, among others.


How-to-do-it models and manuals provide step-by-step guidelines
for most human activity, from baking a cake and playing tennis to
having a relationship and winning a war.   While there have been
some models available for organizing nonviolent actions, based on
Gandhi and King, and organizing communities, based on Alinsky and
Ross, there have been no such analytic tools for evaluating and
organizing social movements.

The lack of a practical analytic model which describes the long
process normally taken by successful social movements disempowers
activists and limits the effectiveness of their movements. 
Without the guiding framework that explains the step-by-step
process that social movements go through, many activists are
unable to identify successes already achieved, set long and short
term goals, confidently develop strategies, tactics, and
programs, and avoid common pitfalls.

Many experienced activists are "take-off junkies".  They know how
to create new social movements, but they do not know how to wage
long-term movements that progress through a series of successive
stages and win actual positive change.  Within two years after
"take-off", most activists inevitably perceive that their
movement is failing, and their own effort are futile.  This leads
to burnout, dropout, and the dissipation of movements. 
Astoundingly, this happens even when social movements are
progressing reasonably well along the road normally taken by
successful social movements in the past!  Consequently, many
activists keep repeating the cycle of "take-off" to "despair and
burnout" with each succeeding new movement.  MAP can enable
activists to be social-change agents who help their movements
progress through all the stages of social movements.

There is another problem we hope MAP alleviates.  Most social
problems need to be resolved through changes in policies and
structures at the national level.  But the national power of
social movements comes from the strength of its local groups;
national social movements are only as powerful as their
grassroots, yet grassroots groups often are unable to make a
connection between their own efforts and what happens at the
national and international level.  It all seems too distant and
unconnected.  The Movement Action Plan, however, enables local
activists to clearly see a direct connection between their own
efforts and their impact at the national level.


The Movement Action Plan provides activists with a practical,
how-to-do-it analytic tool for evaluating and organizing social
movements that are focused on national and international issues,
such as nuclear energy and weapons, nonintervention in Central
America, civil and human rights, AIDS, democracy and freedom,
apartheid, or ecological responsibility.

MAP describes eight stages through which social movements
normally progress over a period of years and decades.  For each
state, MAP describes the role of the public, powerholders, and
the movement.  It provides organizers with a map of the long road
of successful movements, which helps them guide their movement
along the way.

Most social movements are not just in one stage.  Movements
usually have many demands for policy changes, and their efforts
for each demand are in a specific stage.  The different demands
of the Central America solidarity movement, for example, might be
in the following stages:  prevent U.S. military invasion of
Nicaragua (middle of stage seven), stop aid to the contras (stage
six), and a positive peace resolution in Central America (stage

For each of the movement's major demands or goals, MAP enables
activists to evaluate the movement and identify which stage it is
in; identify successes already achieved; develop effective
strategies, tactics, and programs; establish short- and long-term
goals; and avoid common pitfalls.

Social movements do not fit neatly into MAP's eight stages or
move through them in a linear way.  Social movements are more
dynamic.  Movements have a number of different demands, and the
effort for each demand is in a different MAP stage.  When
movements achieve one demand, they focus on achieving other
demands that are at earlier stages.  For example, in 1960, the
civil rights movement's restaurant sin-in campaign successfully
went through all the stages.  This was repeated over the next
years with buses and public accommodations, and it was repeated
again in the 1965 voting rights movement, whose take-off began in
March with the Selma demonstrations and ended in August with a
Voting Rights Act.

Finally, MAP is only a theoretical model, built from past
experience.  Real-life social movements will neither fit exactly
nor move through the stages linearly, smoothly, or precisely in
the manner outlined.

The purpose of MAP is to give activists hope and empowerment,
increase the effectiveness of social movements, and reduce the
discouragement that often contributes to individual burnout,
dropout, and the winding down of social movements.

                       TWO VIEWS OF POWER

Many activists simultaneously hold two contrasting models of
power--power elite and people power.  Each of these views,
however, leads to opposite movement strategies and target

The Power Elite Model holds that society is organized in the form
of a hierarchical pyramid, with powerful elites at the top and
the relatively powerless mass populace at the bottom.  The
elites, through their dominant control of the state,
institutions, laws, myths, traditions, and social norms, serve
the interests of the elites, often to the disadvantage of the
whole society.  Power flows from the top to bottom.  

Since people are powerless, social change can be achieved only by
appealing to the elites at the top to change their policies
through normal channels and institutions, such as the electoral
process, lobbying Congress, and use of the courts.  The target
constituency is the powerholders, and the method is persuasion,
either convincing existing powerholders to change their view or
to elect  new powerholders.  The chief opposition organizations
are professional opposition organizations (POOs), which have
national offices and staff in Washington, D.C., with regional
offices around the country.

The People Power Model holds that power ultimately resides in the
mass populace.  Even in societies with strong power elites, such
as the United States or Marcos-led Philippines, the powerholders'
power is dependent on the cooperation, acquiescence, or support
of the mass public.  This model is represented by an inverse
triangle, with the people at the top and the power elite at the

People power is the model used by social movements.  The
movement's strategy is not only to use normal channels in an
effort to persuade powerholders such as President Reagan to
change their minds, but also to alert, educate, and mobilize a
discontented, impassioned, and determined grassroots population
using nonviolent means beyond the normal parliamentary methods


The source or power of social movements lies in two human

*    A strong sense of rights and wrong.  People have deeply felt
     beliefs and values, and they react with extreme passion and
     determination when they realize that these values are

*    We understand the world and reality, in large part, through

Social movements derive their power from an upset impassioned,
and motivated populace set into motion.  This happens when people
recognize that their strongly felt beliefs, values, and interests
are unjustly violated, and the population is provided with hope
that change can happen and a means for them to act.  People are
especially aroused to action when trusted public leaders, such as
the President or Congresspeople, violate the public's trust to
carry out their duties of office in an honest and lawful manner.

The Irangate fiasco demonstrates this.  Over a period of years,
the administration carefully built up the danger of a new demon,
Middle East terrorists, to scare the American people so they
would support future U.S. military undertakings in the Middle
East.  Simultaneously, President Reagan was pictured as the
nation's protector against this new demon.  His image was built
up as a strong father--Rambo and John Wayne rolled into one.  The
people were led to believe he will use every means to challenge
and defeat terrorism everywhere.  No deals.  No compromises. 
Reagan's popularity soared.  This popularity took a nose dive,
however, beginning in November, 1986, when Irangate expose'
revealed that Reagan violated the public's trust and then lied to
the public in an extensive cover-up.  This follows the process of
the demise of President Nixon during Watergate.


The process of achieving social change through social movements
is the struggle between the movement and powerholders of the
hearts, minds, and support (or acquiescence) of the general
public.  The powerholders advocate policies that are to the
advantage of society's elites, but often to the disadvantage of
the majority population and in violation of its strongly held
values.  Before movements begin, however, the populace is usually
unaware of the problem and the violation of their values, but
they would be very upset and easily spurred to action if they
knew.  This was the situation regarding nuclear energy before
1977, the nuclear arms race before 1980, U.S. intervention in
Central America before 1983, and U.S. arms to Iran before the
Fall of 1986.

                    THE POWERHOLDER' STRATEGY

The powerholders maintain their power and the status quo by
hiding the moral violations of social conditions and by their
policies through the following strategies:

  *  The first line of defense is through a strategy of
     "bureaucratic management" to prevent the issue from becoming
     a public issue.  This is achieved by (1) internalized
     obedience," keeping the problem out of the public's view of
     the world and thereby out of people's consciousness; (2)
     keeping issues out of the public spotlight and off the
     society's agenda; and (3) keeping the issue off of society's
     political agenda of hotly contested issues.

     Some of the means used by the powerholders to achieve this
     strategy are the following:  (1) maintain hegemony of
     information available to the public through the media; (2)
     deny that the problem exists (e.g., "no arms have been sent
     to Iran"); (3) create "societal myths" which define the
     problem for the public exactly the opposite of reality, such
     as calling the contras "freedom fighters" or saying that the
     Marcos Duvallier governments were part of the "free world";
     and (4) create the threat of demons, such as Communism and
     terrorism, to install fear in the general population so that
     they will unquestioningly support whatever policies the
     powerholders take.

  *  After a policy becomes a public issue, the powerholders are
     forced to switch to a "crisis management" strategy by doing
     the following:  (1) vindicate unjust policies through
     "justification myths", which explain that their policies are
     needed to overcome a bigger evil (e.g., "we need to support
     President Marcos, a minor dictator, to prevent the worse
     evil of the Communist takeover in the Philippines"); (2) re-
     emphasize old demons or create new ones; (3) create trigger
     events to justify a new policy and to get public consent,
     such as when the American Government got the support of the
     American people for escalating the Vietnam War by
     proclaiming that American ships were attacked in the Gulf of
     Tonkin; (4) overcome public opposition by first ignoring
     then discrediting, destabilizing, and if necessary,
     repressing the movement; (5) appearing to be involved in a
     resolution process through promises, new rhetoric,
     appointing studies and commissions, and negotiations, as in
     the Geneva nuclear arms reduction meetings; (6) make minor
     changes through reforms, compromises, and cooptation of
     opponents; and (7) co-opt the opposition.

  *  The chief means by which the powerholders maintain unjust
     policies and keep them hidden from the public is by having a
     two-track system of "official" vs. "operative" doctrines and
     policies.  (These are Noam Chomsky's terms.)  Official
     policies are fictitious policies which are given to the
     general public.  They are explained in high-sounding moral
     terms, such as democracy and freedom.  Operative policies,
     on the other hand, are the government's actual policies,
     which are kept hidden from the public because they violate
     widely held values and therefore would upset most citizens. 
     For example, after the Boland amendment was passed in 1984
     forbidding U.S. governmental aid to the Nicaraguan contras,
     the Reagan administration adopted an official policy of not
     providing governmental aid; yet, the Irangate revelations
     have exposed the Administration's operative policy of
     providing massive covert government aid spearheaded by
     Ollie North and the National Security Council.

                     THE MOVEMENT'S STRATEGY

The Movement's aim is to educate and win over an increasingly
larger majority of the public, and to mobilize the majority
public into an effective force that brings about social change. 
To achieve this, movements need to be grounded in the strongly
felt and widely held human and cultural values, symbols,
sensibilities, and traditions of the general population, such as
freedom, democracy, justice, and human rights (but not those
cultural values with which we disagree, such as the Monroe
Doctrine's proclamation that the U.S. has the right to dominate
Latin America).  Only by showing the Public that the movement
upholds these values, and that the powerholders violate them, can
the population be won over and stirred to the level of passion
required for them to act.  In contrast, movement activities and
attitudes that violate the society's values and sensibilities,
including acts of violence and rebellious machismo posturing,
have the opposite effect; they turn both the public and many
other activists against the movement.

The movement's strategy, mirroring that of the powerholders,
needs to accomplish the following:

  *  Publicly show that the social conditions and powerholder
     policies violate values, traditions, and self-interests of
     the general public.  This includes publicly revealing the
     difference between official and operative policies and

  *  Keep the issue and moral violations in the public spotlight
     and on society' agenda of hotly contested issues.

  *  Keep the issue and powerholders' policies on society's
     political agenda, such as having aid to the contras voted
     on in Congress rather than carried out secretly by the CIA.

  *  Counter the powerholders' social myths justifications, and
     denials that the problem exists.

  *  Counter the powerholders' demonology.  For example, the
     thousands of American "citizen diplomats" who visit Russia
     counter the Reagan demonology that the Soviets are monsters
     and an "evil empire" by revealing that the Russians are
     people like us.

  *  Involve increasingly larger portions of the public in
     programs that challenge the powerholders' policies and
     promote alternative visions and programs.

  *  Don't compromise too much too soon.

  *  After a large majority of public opinion is won, have an
     "endgame" strategy that mobilizes the populace and
     institutions to create change, despite the determined
     opposition of the central powerholders.

  *  Finally the movement's organizations and leadership,
     especially at the national and regional levels, should
     serve, nurture, and empower the grassroots activists and
     promote participatory democracy within the movement.

                    STAGE ONE:  NORMAL TIMES

In this first stage--normal times--there are many conditions that
grossly violate widely held cherished human values such as
freedom, democracy, security, and justice, and the best interests
of society as a whole.  Moreover, these conditions are maintained
by the policies of public and private powerholders, and a
majority of public opinion.  Yet, these violations of values,
sensibilities, and self-interest of the general society are
relatively unnoticed; they are neither in the public spotlight
nor on society's agenda of hotly contested issues.  Normal times
are politically quiet times.

Some past normal times were the violations of Blacks' civil
rights before 1960; the Vietnam War before 1967; and U.S.
intervention in Central America and support for Marcos,
Duvalier, and apartheid before 1985.


The opposition of these conditions and policies is small and
receives more public ridicule than support.  Consequently, its
efforts are relatively ineffective.  There are three major kinds
of opposition:  professional opposition organizations (POOs),
ideological or principled dissent groups, and grassroots groups
that represent the victims.

The professional opposition organizations are centralized formal
organizations, often with national offices in Washington, D.C.,
which try to win achievable reforms through mainstream political
channels such as the electoral process, Congress, and the courts. 
They are hierarchical, with a board of directors, strong staff,
and a mass membership that carries out nationally decided
programs.  These efforts have little success because they do not
have sufficient public support to provide the political clout
required to create change.

The principled dissent groups hold nonviolent demonstrations,
rallies, pickets, and occasional civil disobedience actions. 
These groups are usually small, little noticed, and ineffective
at achieving their demands.  Through their symbolic actions,
however, the principled dissent groups are a shining moral light
in the darkness.

The grassroots groups are composed of local citizens who oppose
present conditions and policies but do not yet have the support
of the majority local population.  They represent the victims'
perspective, provide direct services to victims, and also carry
out programs similar to those of the other opposition groups.


The powerholders often promote policies that support the
interests of society's privileged and powerful, and which violate
the interests and values of the society as a whole.  The
powerholders maintain these policies primarily by keeping them
out of the public spotlight and off the society's agenda of
contested issues.  They have to keep these policies hidden from
the general public because they know that the populace would be
upset and demand changes if they knew the truth.  The
powerholders are able to maintain these policies and keep them
hidden from the public by successfully carrying out their two-
tact strategy of highly proclaiming their official doctrine and
policies, stated in terms of the society's values and interests,
while hiding from the public their actual or operative doctrines
and policies.


A political and social consensus supports the powerholders'
official policies and status quo because the public does not know
that the government is actually functioning according to the
opposite operative doctrine policies.  Consequently, the general
populace is unaware that the social conditions and public
policies violate their values and self interests; or, when they
do know, they believe the justifications as to why they can't be
changed or are needed to protect a higher cause or value.  As a
result, the public is not aware that there is a serious problem. 
Possibly only 10 to 15 percent of the populations disagrees with
the powerholders' policies.


The goals at this stage are:

  *  to document that a serious problem exists,

  *  to maintain an active opposition no matter how small, and

  *  to move to the next stages.


The main danger is to be stuck in normal times indefinitely
because of political naivete, not knowing the realities of
political and social life, and feeling powerless to create


Normal times are politically quiet times because the powerholders
successfully promote their official doctrine and policies while
hiding their actual operative doctrine and policies, thereby
keeping the violations of conditions and their policies out of
the public consciousness and off society's agenda.  The
opposition feels hopeless because it seems that the situation
will continue indefinitely, and they feel powerless to change it. 
Beneath the calm surface, however, the contradictions between
society's values and the powerholders' actual, operative policies
hold the seeds for popular discontent that can create dramatic

                   Stage One - 1940s to 1960s

The American government launched the nuclear weapons era in the
1940s to fulfill its new role as the dominant world power.  This
was followed within a few years by the nuclear energy era. 
Although it was given lots of media hype as the "peaceful atom",
there was virtually no public discussion and debate regarding the
merits of the new energy policy.  The public heard only the
official policy that nuclear energy was a modern miracle which
would provide clean, safe, and unlimited electricity that was too
cheap to meter.

The operative policy was that the full government apparatus had
to provide massive financial, legal, and developmental support to
make nuclear energy possible.  At the same time, all the
information that nuclear energy was actually dangerous, dirty,
unbelievably expensive, unnecessary, and finite, was suppressed. 
The public was not told about the nuclear accident at Detroit's
Fermi reactor in 1966, which was similar to the later accident at
Three Mile Island.

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was the official governmental
watchdog agency assigned to look after the public's welfare. 
Instead, it promoted nuclear energy at all costs, overriding
laws, rules, costs, and safety while suppressing all opposition. 
Nevertheless, public opposition managed to stop some of the more
outrageous plans, such as nuclear dumping in Cape Cod and a
nuclear reactor in Queens.  Moreover, a ballot referendum stopped
a nuclear plant in Eugene, Oregon.

A national consensus supported the powerholders' dreams of a
glowing nuclear energy future.  Nuclear energy was not a public
issue on society's agenda, for information supporting the
official policies dominated information received by the public.


The intensity of public feeling, opinion, and upset required for
social movements to occur can happen only when the public
realizes that the governmental policies violate widely held
beliefs and values.  The public's upset becomes especially
intensified when official authorities violate the public trust by
using the power of office to deceive the public and govern
unfairly and unlawfully.  Hannah Arendt wrote that "people are
more likely driven to action by the unveiling of hypocrisy than
the prevailing conditions."  This was clearly shown by the
dramatic turnaround of the American public's opinion of President
Reagan after Irangate exposed that instead of acting on his
official policy of leading the world's defiant fight against
terrorists, his operative policy was actually cooperating,
supporting, and making deals with terrorists.


The opposition must prove both that the problem exists and that
the official powerholders and institutions perpetuate the
problem.  Therefore, the opposition must:

  *  Undertake research to prove that a problem exists which
     violates social values and sensibilities.

  *  Prove that the official doctrine and policies of
     governmental powerholders and institutions violate society's
     values and the public trust.  This must be not only from
     researching the facts but also from actually trying every
     avenue for official citizen participation in the democratic
     process for deciding on social policies and programs, and
     proving that they do not work.

  *  Testify, undertake challenges, and file complaints in every
     branch of the bureaucratic machinery at the local, state,
     and federal level of both public and private bodies that are
     supposed to be open for citizen participation and redress.

  *  Prove that they are "kangaroo courts".  Go to every    
     decision-making body whether welcome or not.

  *  File suit in the courts.

  *  Take their concerns to city council, state assembly, and
     national Congress.  These programs are usually primarily
     carried out through the auspices of professional opposition

Positive results are not expected now.  The point is not to win
the cases, but to prove that the powerholders are preventing the
democratic system from working.  Eventually, however, some of
these cases might actually be won and have the powerful impact of
creating a movement and social change.  After twenty years in the
courts, for example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's case of Brown
vs. U.S. was won in the Supreme Court in 1954.  It established
the principle that "separate but equal" was no longer the law of
the land, which became a legal basis for the civil rights


The powerholders fight the opposition through the normal
channels, usually winning easily while continuing their operative
policies and programs.  The powerholders do not feel much
threatened or concerned, and they handle the situation as a
problem of bureaucratic management rather than a crisis of public
confidence and power.  Through the mass media, they easily
promote their official policies while hiding their operative
policies thus successfully keeping the whole potential problem
out of peoples' consciousness and the public spotlight, and off
of society's agenda.


Public opinion and social consensus continues to support the
government's official policies and status quo, as the
consciousness of the general population remains unchanged.  Yet,
even the low level of evolving conditions and opposition causes
public opinion against these policies to rise from about 10 to 20
percent.  Except for the rare media coverage of opponents'
activities, the problem is still neither in the public spotlight
nor on society's agenda of contested issues.


  *  Document the problem, including the involvement of the   

  *  Document the citizens' attempt to use the normal channels of
     citizen participation and prove that they did not work.

  *  Become experts.

  *  Build small opposition organizations.


  *  Holding the belief that social problems can be corrected by
     POOs using mainstream institutions and methods without
     building a new social consensus, mobilizing widespread
     grassroots opposition, and engaging in a long struggle,
     which uses extra-parliamentary nonviolent action that
     changes the present imbalance of power.

  *  Continuing to feel powerless and hopeless.


This stage can be particularly disheartening.  The problem and
the policies of powerholders continue unabated, there is little
dissent or publicity, and the situation seems like it might
continue indefinitely--as indeed it might.  Yet the efforts of
this stage can eventually be used to prove that the emperor has
no clothes and is a prerequisite for any future social movement. 
Nevertheless, this stage is for the stout-hearted, determined,
and persistent.

                    Stage Two - 1970 to 1974

The nuclear energy era moved rapidly in the early 1970s.  There
were more than 25 new reactor orders each year.  By the end of
1974, the number of operating reactors grew to 52, and the total
number of reactors operating, ordered, and under construction
leapt to 260.

It seemed that the nuclear era was well on its way to achieving
the government's goal of 1,000 operating plants by the year 2000. 
A total social and political consensus supported the nuclear
era's official policies and objectives, new reactor orders were 
pouring in, and the problems regarding nuclear energy were kept
out of the public spotlight and society's agenda hotly contested

There was, however, a tremendous growth of citizen opposition,
though still relatively small and unnoticed.  Independent
grassroots groups of local citizens sprang up around many of the
new reactor sites.  They challenged the building of the reactors
in long and laborious AEC licensing hearings, which were held
both locally and on Capitol Hill.  While these efforts were
essentially futile, they proved that the AEC hearings were a
"kangaroo court", they documented the overwhelming negative
aspects of nuclear energy, and they made experts out of local
citizens.  The hearings began being held at local reactor sites;
and statewide citizen initiatives were held.  Although most of
these initiatives lost by a two-to-one margin, they served to
educate the public and build opposition.

The public still mainly supported nuclear power and was little
aware of its problems.  Yet, public opinion against nuclear
energy grew 20 to 30 percent, as measured by the results of the


The "take-off" of a new social movement requires preconditions
that build up over many years.  These conditions include broad
historic developments, a growing discontented population of
victims and allies, and a budding autonomous grassroots
opposition, all of which encourage discontent with the present
conditions, raise expectations that they can change, and provide
the means to do it.

The historical forces are usually long-term, broad trends and
events that worsen the problem, upset subpopulations, raise
expectations, promote the means for new activism, and personify
the problem.  They are mostly outside the control of the
opposite.  For example, some of the historical forces that made
the 1960s ripe for the Black civil rights movement included the
emergence of independent Black African countries, the large
Northern migration of Blacks who maintained their ties to the
segregated South, the rising black college student population,
and the 1954 Supreme Court's Brown vs. U.S. decision that
provided a legal basis for full civil rights.


A tremendous unheralded ripening process happens within

  *  There needs to be a growing consciousness and discontent
     among sub-populations of victims and their allies, providing
     them with a new level of understanding about the seriousness
     of the problem, the values violations, how they are
     affected, and the illicit involvement of the powerholders
     and their institutions.  The discontent can be caused by (1)
     either perceived or real worsening conditions, which creates
     many new victims, such as in the 1970s when hundreds of new
     atomic plant sites upset millions of Americans who lived
     nearby; (2) rising expectations, as when the new wave of
     Black college students felt themselves to be full citizens
     but were refused the simple civil rights of service at
     local lunch counters; or (3) personalization of the problem,
     in which the problem is revealed through the experience of
     real victims, as when four church women were killed in El
     Salvador in 1980.

  *  The growing numbers of discontented local people across the
     country quietly start new autonomous local groups, which as
     a whole form a "new wave" of grassroots opposition, which is
     independent from the established POOs.  These groups soon
     become frustrated with the official institutions, channels,
     and powerholders, which they realize are totally biased in
     support of the status quo; and they become increasingly
     upset with some of the established POOs, whom they see as
     working in a dead-end process with the powerholders.

  *  Small local prototype demonstrations and nonviolent action
     campaigns begin to dramatize the problem, put a dim public
     spotlight on it, and set a precedent for future actions.

  *  A few key facilitator-visionaries provide the new-wave local
     opposition with information, ideology, training, networking,
     hope, and a vision of a rising opposition.

  *  Pre-existing networks and groups, which can provide support,
     solidarity, and participants for a new movement, need to
     become available to be used in the new movement.  The
     nonintervention movement, for example, had available for its
     take-off church networks, which had lots of experience in
     Central America, and activists who had been in the nuclear
     weapons and energy movements, both of which had just got out
     of their own take-off stages.


Though irritated, the powerholders remain relatively unconcerned,
believing that they can continue to contain the opposition
through management of mainstream social, political, and
communications institutions.  The official policies remain
publicly believed and unchallenged, and the operative policies
continue to be hidden from the general populace.


A public consensus to support the powerholders' policies, and the
problem remains off society's agenda.  Yet, the growing public
awareness of the problem, discontent, and new wave opposition,
primarily at the local level, quietly raises the public opinion
opposing current powerholder policies to 30 percent, even though
the issue remains off society's agenda.


The purpose of this stage is to help create the conditions for
the take-off of a social movement.  The goals are:

  *  Recognize historical conditions that help make a new
     movement possible.

  *  Create, inspire, and prepare the new wave groups, including
     the formation of new networks, leadership, and expertise
     that will spearhead the new movement.

  *  Prepare pre-existing networks to be concerned about the
     issue and involved in the upcoming movement.

  *  Personalize the problem.

  *  Begin a small prototype nonviolent action project.


Some of the key hazards of this stage include:

  *  Not recognizing the ripening conditions for a new social

  *  Having the bureaucracy, legalism, and centralized power of
     the POOs squash the creativity, independence, nonviolent
     methods, and spontaneity of the new grassroots groups.


The stage is set for new social movement.  There is a critical
problem that appears to be worsening, proven violations by the
powerholders, many victims, spreading discontent, historical
conditions, available pre-existing networks, and an emerging new
wave of grassroots opposition.  Yet, no one--the public,
powerholders, or even the new wave activists--is expecting the
emergence of a new movement.

                   Stage Three - 1975 to 1976

Conditions were ripening for the take-off of a new social
movement.  Tens of millions of citizens learned that they had
become personally susceptible to the costs and dangers of nuclear
energy because they lived within 50 miles of a new reactor.  The
grassroots local opposition groups quietly grew in size and
number and became increasingly frustrated as the official
government institution, the AEC, repeatedly violated its own
rules and ignored reasonable citizen concerns in its support of
nuclear energy.  The increasing number of local groups grew into
a substantial new wave of opposition.

The opposition organized statewide referenda in 1976, and
although they lost in seven out of eight states, the process
served to educate the public and to raise public debate. 
Moreover, the Missouri referenda won by a two-to-one margin. 
This was a severe blow to the nuclear industry because it ended
the state CWIP law, which allowed utilities to collect the costs
for building reactors from ratepayers in their monthly electric
bills.  The movement then began getting these laws changed in
most states, thereby undercutting the major means by which
utilities were going to pay to build the hundreds of new

Other ripening signs included:

  *  The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 made anti-war activists
     and networks available for a new movement.

  *  The temporary success of the occupation of the Whyl,
     Germany, nuclear plant site by 25,000 citizens provided an
     inspiring method of nonviolent resistance.

  *  In the Spring of 1976, the AEC local hearing decided to
     license the Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear plant
     construction plans, ignoring the overwhelming legal
     arguments against it.  A few weeks later, the Clamshell
     Alliance held the first civil disobedience occupation of a
     nuclear plant site.  Inspired by the Whyl mass blockade,
     Clamshell announced it would organize a mass blockade the
     next Spring.

Little noticed by either the movement or the public; however,
there were only six new orders and over 20 cancellations of
reactors already on order, dropping the total number of plants
operating and under construction from 260 to 237.  The government
reduced its planned number of operating reactors for the year
2000 to 500.  Still, the nuclear opponents held little hope for
stopping nuclear energy.  The ripening conditions seemed far
short of what would be necessary to stop the apparent expansion
of the nuclear industry.  The government and electric utility
industry continued their operative policies of publicizing the
glories of reactors, and in these two years 10 new operating
reactors brought the total number of "deployed" reactors to 62. 
Although public opposition rose to about 30 percent, nuclear
energy still was not on society's agenda and was supported by the
public consensus.


New social movements surprise and shock everyone when they burst
into the public spotlight on the evening TV news and in newspaper
headlines.  Overnight, a previously unrecognized social problem
becomes a social issue that everyone is talking about.  It starts
with a highly publicized, shocking incident, a "trigger event",
followed by a nonviolent action campaign that includes large
rallies and dramatic civil disobedience.  Soon these are repeated
in local communities around the country.

The trigger event is a shocking incident that dramatically
reveals a critical social problem to the general public in a new
and vivid way, such as the arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to
move to the back of a Montgomery bus in 1955, NATO's 1979
announcement to deploy American Cruise and Pershing 2 nuclear
weapons in Europe, or the Marcos government's shooting of Ninoy
Aquino as he arrived at the Manila airport in 1983.  Trigger
events can be deliberate acts by individuals, governments, or the
opponents, or they can be accidents.

By starkly revealing to the public that a social condition and
powerholder policies blatantly violate widely held cherished
social values, citizen self-interest, and the public trust, the
trigger event instills a profound sense of moral outrage in the
general populace.  Consequently, the general population responds
with great passion, demanding an explanation from the
powerholders and ready to hear more information from the
opposition.  The trigger event is also a trumpet's call to
action for the new wave opposition groups around the country.


A new social movement is created only when the opposition
organizes a dramatic nonviolent action campaign immediately
following the trigger event and when the nonviolent action
campaign is repeated in local areas across the country.  The
nonviolent action campaign keeps the public spotlight on the
problem and builds social tension over time.  This "politics as
theater" process becomes a social crisis, which turns the problem
into a public issue.  The shooting of Aquino, for example, was
followed the next week by a million people in a Marcos-banned
funeral march down the streets of Manila, and the NATO Cruise and
Pershing 2 decision was followed by gigantic protest
demonstrations in the capitols of Europe.

The success of nonviolent action campaigns is based on sociodrama
demonstrations.  Sociodrama demonstrations are simple
demonstrations that:

  *  are dramatic and exciting;

  *  enable demonstrators to put themselves into the key points
     where the powerholders carry out their policies;

  *  clearly reveal the values violations by the powerholders;

  *  show the movement supporting and representing the values,
     symbols, myths, and traditions of the society; and

  *  are repeatable in local communities across the country.

These are dilemma demonstrations in which the powerholders lose
regardless of their reaction.  If they ignore the demonstrators,
the policies are prevented from being carried out.  If, on the
other hand, the demonstrators are harassed or arrested, it puts
public sympathy on the side of the demonstrators and against the
powerholders.  For example, during the sit-ins when Blacks sat at
the lunch counters to eat, if angry white crowds attacked them or
the police arrested them, the public got upset and sided with the
demonstrators; if the police did nothing, the Blacks would
either have to be served or, just by sitting there, prevent
business as usual.

The new movement takes off as the nonviolent action campaigns are
their sociodrama actions are repeated in local communities
throughout the country.  The demonstrations in Manila, for
example, were followed by demonstration throughout the
Philippines.  The 1977 Seabrook reactor occupation created
immediate spontaneous support demonstrations across the country,
and, within months, hundreds of new grassroots anti-nuclear
energy groups started up, who soon began occupying their own
local nuclear power plants.

Scores of new independent local action groups spring into being,
forming a new wave decentralized grassroots autonomous opposition
that is based on non violent resistance.  Movement take-off is
the result of thousands of people across the country taking
spontaneous actions and forming new protest groups (or
revitalizing old ones).  These new groups usually adopt loose
organizational structures that are based on direct participatory
democracy, little formal structure, and loosely defined
membership.  Together these groups form a new wave of movement
because they are a new force and are not connected to either the
established POOs or principled dissent organizations.

Why do social movements take off?  Some of the reasons why
movements take off are:

  *  The right conditions were created by the earlier stages.

  *  The public, altered by the mass media because of the trigger
     event and nonviolent action campaigns, is outraged by the
     contradiction between its values and the social conditions
     and powerholders' operative policies.

  *  The new movement groups join the powerholders as the keepers
     of society's values and symbols.

  *  The new climate of social crisis gives hope and inspires
     action by many citizens.

  *  The repeatability of the nonviolent action campaign is local
     areas provides grassroots activists with an effective means
     for involvement, which they believe can be effective.

  *  Participation in the new movement gives meaning to many
     peoples' lives because it gives them an opportunity to act
     out their beliefs, feelings, and spirituality.


The powerholders are shocked, upset, and angry.  They realize
that the genie is out of the bottle.  They have lost on the
first law of political control:  keep issues out of people's
consciousness and the public spotlight, and off society's
agendas.  They take a hard line in defending their policies and
criticizing the new movement, calling it radical, irresponsible,
and even communist-inspired.  While some liberal politicians
support the movement's position, mainstream Republicans and
Democrats alike continue to support existing government policies.


Within a year or two, public opinion opposing government
operative policies rapidly grows from 30 percent of 50 percent,
as for the first time the general populace sees the operative
policies and hears views countering those of the powerholders. 
The public is upset and concerned by the stark contrast between
what they see and hear in the news and what the government tells
them.  That is, they begin to see for the first time the
difference between the official and operative policies revealed
to them by the trigger event and the movement.


The overall goal of this stage is to get the whole society to
begin seeing, thinking, and acting on the social problem.  A
movement take-off gets the whole society moving on the issue. 

The specific goals are:

  *  Create a new grassroots-based social movement.

  *  Put the powerholders' policies in the public consciousness
     and spotlight and on society's agenda of contentious public

  *  Create a public platform for the movement to educate the

  *  Create public dissonance on the issue.  That is, force the
     general population to have to think about the issue by
     having two contradictory views of reality presented to them

  *  Win the sympathies and the opinions of the public.

  *  Become recognized as the legitimate opposition.

  *  Getting the powerholders to change their minds and policies
     is not a goal of this stage!


The main pitfalls of this stage are:

  *  political naivete;

  *  burnout from overwork, not seeing progress as success, and
     unrealistic expectations of immediate victory; and

  *  arrogant self-righteousness and radicalism.


The take-off stage is an exciting time of trigger event, dramatic
actions, passion, a new social movement, public spotlight,
crisis, high hopes and output of energy.  Both a previously
unrecognized social problem and official policies become a public
issue, and within two years a majority public opinion is won. 
But take-off is the shortest stage.  After relatively rapidly
achieving the goals of this stage, the movement progresses to
Stage Six.  However, many activists don't recognize this success. 
Instead, they believe that the movement has failed and their own
efforts have been futile; consequently, they move to Stage Five.

                    Stage Four:  1977 to 1978

The nuclear power opposition turned into a social movement in the
Spring of 1977.  the arrest and jailing for two weeks of 1,414
Clamshell Alliance protesters who were blockading the Seabrook
nuclear power construction site served as the trigger event,
putting this issue in the worldwide media spotlight for weeks. 
Support demonstrations sprung up across the country while the
protesters were still in jail.  National media interviewed the
jailed protesters daily, providing them with a platform for
educating the public and becoming recognized as a legitimate
opposition.  Moreover, by the end of the year, the Seabrook
action inspired the formation of a new local anti-nuclear groups
and similar blockade actions across the country, launching a new
anti-nuclear energy social movement led by the new wave of local
independent groups.

By 1978, local and state referenda went against nuclear energy in
a number of places.  Kern County, California, reversed the two-
to-one vote of 1976, rejecting the planned Wasco nuclear plant. 
New Hampshire voted against CWIP and voted out pro-nuclear, anti-
Clamshell incumbent Governor Thompson.  Public opinion rose to
about 50 percent against nuclear energy.

The nuclear industry again appeared to be advancing nicely, as
the number of operating plants rose to 71.  But there were no new
nuclear reactor orders, and 21 reactors already under
construction were cancelled, drastically reducing the total
number of reactors operating under construction to 195.  The
powerholders took a hard line in support of nuclear, warned of
future blackouts and a weakened America, and attacked the new
movement as violent, naive, and anti-American.

The opposition successfully created a new social movement through
nonviolent actions, became recognized as legitimate, educated the
general public, and put nuclear energy in the public spotlight
and on society's agenda.


After a year or two, the high hopes of movement take-off seems
inevitably to turn into despair.  Most activists lose their faith
that success is just around the corner and come to believe that
it is never going to happen.  They perceive that the powerholders
are too strong, their movement has failed, and their own efforts
have been futile.  Most surprising is the fact that this identity
crisis of powerlessness and failure happens when the movement is
outrageously successful--when the movement has just achieved all
of the goals of the take-off stage within two years.  This stage
of feelings of self-identity crisis and powerlessness occurs
simultaneously with Stage Six because the movement as a whole has
progressed to the majority stage.


Belief that the movement is failing

Many activists conclude that their movement is failing because
they believe that:

  *  The movement has not achieved its goals.  After two years of
     hard effort, which included big demonstrations, dramatic
     civil disobedience, arrests, court scenes and even time in
     jail, media attention, and even winning a majority of public
     opinion against the powerholders' policies, the movement has
     not achieved any of its goals.  The government is still
     waging the war in Vietnam, building five nuclear weapons a
     day, or sending aid to the contras.  The problem, however,
     is not that the movement has failed to achieve its goals,
     but that expectations that its goal could possibly be
     achieved in such a short time were unrealistic.  Achieving
     changes in public policies in the face of determined
     opposition of the powerholders takes time, often decades.

     Judging that the movement has failed because it has not
     achieved its goals after two years is analogous to parents
     criticizing their daughter for not graduating after
     completing two years in college with straight "A" grades. 
     Parents don't do this because they know that achieving a
     B.S. degree is a four-year process.  The movement, therefore
     should be judged not by whether it has won yet, but by how
     well it is progressing along the road of success.

  *  The movement has not had any "real" victories.  This view is
     unable to accept the progress that the movement has made
     along the road of success, such as creating a massive
     grassroots-based social movement, putting the issue on
     society's agenda, or winning a majority of public opinion. 
     Ironically, involvement in the movement tends to reduce
     activists' ability to identify short-term successes. 
     Through the movement, activists learn about the enormity of
     the problem, the agonizing suffering of the victims, and the
     complicity of powerholders.  The intensity of this
     experience tends to increase despair and the unwillingness
     to accept any short-term success short of achieving ultimate
     goals.  "What difference does it make that a majority of the
     American people and Congress oppose contra aid, when people
     are still being killed in Central America?"  This is another
     version of judging the movement for not having achieved its
     ultimate goals rather than by whether it is making
     reasonable progress along the road.

  *  The power holders seem too powerful--they have not changed
     either their minds or their policies, but defiantly proclaim
     them louder than ever, totally ignoring the protests of the
     movement and the objections of half of the populace.  The
     failure of the central powerholders to change either their
     minds or policies is a poor indicator of the movement's
     progress.  The central powerholders will be the last segment
     of society to change their minds and policies.  The longer
     that the public sees that the powerholders are violating
     social values and ignoring the democratic majority opinion,
     the higher the political costs to the powerholders for
     continuing those policies.  Continued used public exposure
     of the powerholders upholding these policies in the face of
     public opinion, therefore, can be an indicator that the
     powerholders' original goal of keeping the issue out of
     public consciousness and off the society's agenda is
     failing.  For example, with increasing worldwide media
     coverage of President Botha's proclamations of apartheid and
     the effects of this policy, the world's resistance to
     apartheid increases.

  *  The movement is dead because it no longer looks like the
     take-off stage.  The image that most people have of
     successful social movement is that of the take-off stage--
     giant demonstrations, civil disobedience, media hype,
     crisis, and constant political theater--but this is always
     short-lived.  Movements that are successful in take-off soon
     progress to the much more powerful but more sedate-appearing
     majority stage, as described in the next section.  Although
     movements in the majority stage appear to be smaller and
     less effective as they move from a national to local focus,
     and from mass actions to less visible grassroots organizing,
     they actually undergo enormous growth in size and power. 
     The power of the invisible grassroots provide the power of
     national social movements.

  *  The powerholders and mass media report that the movement is
     dead, irrelevant, or non-existent.  The powerholders and
     mass media not only report that the movement is failing, but
     they also refuse to acknowledge that a massive popular
     movement exists.  Large demonstrations and majority public
     opposition are dismissed as "vaguely reminiscent of the
     Sixties", rather than recognized as social movements at
     least as big and relevant as those 20 years ago.  And when
     movements do succeed, they are not given credit.  The demise
     of nuclear energy is said to be caused by cost overruns,
     high lending rates, lack of safety, Chernobyl and Three Mile
     Island, rather than from the political and public
     opposition created by the people power.

Battle Fatigue

By the end of take-off, many activists suffer from "battle
fatigue".  After two years of virtual 'round-the-clock activity
in a crisis atmosphere, at great personal sacrifice, many
activists find themselves mentally and physically exhausted and
don't see anything to show for it.  Out of quilt or an extreme
sense of urgency, many are unable to pace themselves with
adequate rest, fun, leisure, and attendance to personal business. 
Eventually, large numbers of activists who were part of movement
take-off lose hope and a sense of purpose; they become depressed,
burn out, and drop out.

Stuck in Protest

Another reason why many activists become depressed at this time
is that they are unable to switch from protesting against
authority in a crisis atmosphere to waging long-term struggle to
achieve positive changes.  Many activists are unable to switch
their view of the process of success from one of mass
demonstrations to that of winning the majority of public through
long-term grassroots organizing.  Consequently, being active in
Stage Six feels like they are abandoning the movement.  In
addition, many principled dissenters believe that the majority
stage movement is not pure enough.  The new movement
organizations are seen as a new oppressive authority.  Many other
activists originally joined the movement assuming it was a short-
term time of crisis and are not prepared for long-term
involvement.  Finally, another reason why many activists are
unable to switch to Stage Six is that they do not have the
knowledge or skills required to understand or participate in the
majority stage.  For example, nonviolence trainers play a
critical leadership and teaching role during the take-off stage,
but virtually disappear in the majority stage because they lack
the understanding and skills to train activists to participate in
this stage.

Rebelliousness, machismo, and more "militant" action and violence
are some of the negative effects of feelings of despair and

Some activists at this time adopt more militant, even violent,
actions.  They believe the nonviolent methods used to date have
failed because they were too weak.  New splinter groups are
started to carry out the militant strategy, such as the Committee
for Direct Action at Seabrook in 1979.  These efforts are often
reckless and defiant acts of despair, frustration and rage, which
stem from the collapse of unrealistic expectations that the
movement should have achieved its goals within the first two
years.  Because they turn off both other activists and the
general public, militant actions invariably do more harm than
good.  These methods are also advocated by outside groups who
want to use the movements to pursue their own ends, or by agent

The movement needs to make deliberate effort to undercut this
problem.  First, it needs to reduce the feelings of despair and
disempowerment by providing activists with a long term strategic
framework, such as MAP, which helps them realize that they are
powerful and winning, not losing.  Also, it is important that the
movement adopt clear guidelines of total nonviolence, which are
widely publicized and agreed to by all groups and activists which
officially participate in the movement.  The nonviolent policy
must be enforced by having nonviolent guidelines and training
for all demonstration participants, and by having adequate
"peacekeeping" at all demonstrations.
Widespread Burnout

The feelings of failure and exhaustion, the organizational
crisis, the calls for militant actions, confusion, hopelessness,
and powerlessness all contribute to widespread burnout among

Organizational Crisis

The loose organizational model of the new wave local
organizations begins to become a liability after six months. 
The loose structure promoted the flexibility, creativity,
participatory democracy, independence, and solidarity needed for
quick decisions and nonviolent actions during take-off.  But
after six months, the loose organizational structures tend to
cause excessive inefficiency, participant burnout, and an
informal hierarchy.

Toward Empowerment

Movement activists need to realize what the powerholders already
know--that power ultimately lies with the people, not the
powerholders.  They need to recognize the power and success of
social movements--including their own.  Some ways in which
activists can overcome their identity crisis of disempowerment
are the following:

  *  Use an analytic framework of successful social movements,
     such as MAP, to evaluate their movement, identify successes,
     and set strategy and tactics.

  *  Form personal/political support groups that enable activists
     to participate in movements as holistic human beings, take
     care of their personal needs, reduce guilt, have fun, and
     provide support (and challenge) in doing political analysis
     and work.

  *   Adopt a strict policy of nonviolence.

  *  Adopt "empowerment" models of organization and leadership
     at both the national and local levels.  The empowerment
     model is a third way that tries to maximize the positive and
     minimize the negatives of both the hierarchical and the
     loose models, trying to blend participatory democracy,
     efficiency, personal support, and effectiveness.  This model
     of leadership more resembles the nurturing mother than the 
     strong patriarchal father.  While the national organization
     leadership need to coordinate and represent the whole
     movement, their primary goal should be to nurture the
     empowerment of the grassroots and foster democracy and non-
     elitism within the whole movement.

  *  Help activists evolve from protestors to long-term social
     change agents.  Provide social change agent training, which
     includes not only nonviolence but all the skills for
     understanding and organizing successful social change


  *  Continue a hardline strategy, including escalating their
     policies to prove that they are in charge and that both the
     movement and public have no effect.

  *  Infiltrate the movement to get intelligence and to confuse,
     disrupt, and discredit the new activism.  Agent provocateurs
     promote wild schemes, violence, structurelessness,
     disorganization, rebelliousness, machismo, and schemes to
     dominate organizations.


The general populace experiences dissonance, not knowing who or
what to believe.  While many agree with the movement's
challenges, they also fear siding with dissidents and losing the
security of the powerholders and status quo.  The alternatives
are unclear to them.  The general citizenry is about evenly
divided, 50 percent to 50 percent, between the powerholders and
the movement.  Movement violence, rebelliousness, and seeming
anti-Americanism turn people off and tend to frighten them into
supporting the powerholders' policies, police actions, and status


The overall goal is to help activists become empowered and move
on to Stage Six, to catch up with their movement.  They need to
learn what the long road of success looks like, and how far they
have come along that road.  Some specific goals are to help

  *  become strategists by using a framework such as MAP,
  *  form political and personal support groups,

  *  adopt nonviolence,

  *  adopt empowerment models of organization and leadership, and

  *  move from protesters and long-life social change agents.


The chief pitfalls of this stage that must be overcome are:

  *  Disempowerment--feeling the movement is loosing when it is

  *  The "tyranny of structurelessness" and anti-leadership

  *  Rebellion, machismo, and violence

  *  Despair, burnout, and dropout


The crisis of identity and powerless is a personal crisis for
activists.  After the experience of a movement in take-off stage,
their view of the world and themselves is transformed.  They come
to realize that the problem is more serious than they had
thought, the governmental institutions, powerbrokers, and
democratic processes which they thought would help solve social
problems were actually part of the problem, and that the problem
can only be resolved if they are part of the solution.  Rather
than feeling depressed and powerless, activists now need to
recognize the power and success of themselves and their movement. 
The need to realize that their movement has successfully
progressed to Stage Six, to the majority opinion stage, and they
need to catch up to it by finding a role for themselves and the
group in waging Stage Six.

                     Stage Five:  1978 Plus

While anti-nuclear movement progressed to Stage Six in 1979, many
of the new wave activists got stuck in Stage Five, beginning in
1978.  They believed that their movement was ineffective and
dying.  Not one reactor was permanently stopped by nonviolent
blockades, and attendance at demonstrations dropped rather than
increasing exponentially as was believed to be necessary.  They
did not count as important their successes--that in two years
they created a new nationwide grassroots-based social movement, a
majority of the public questioned nuclear energy, the public was
being educated, and nuclear energy was put in the public
spotlight and on society's agenda.

These activists chiefly saw that reactors continued to be built
and started up.  They discounted that there were no new reactor
orders, dozens of plant cancellations, and rapidly dropping
number of nuclear reactors being built and on order.  They judged
that their movement was losing because it had not yet won, not by
how well it was progressing along the long road of success. 
Consequently, many activists, feeling powerless and despondent,
burned out and dropped out.  Others, still believing in the
romantic myth that the nuclear energy era was to be stopped by
forceful resistance, started "militant" groups such as the
Coalition for Direct Actions.  This strategy died, though, after
several years.

Many of these activists joined demonstrations during re-trigger
events, such as the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, and most
soon joined the Nuclear Freeze or non-intervention movements when
they achieved take-off stage in the early 1980s.


The movement must consciously undergo a transformation from
spontaneous protest, operating in a short-term crisis, to a long-
term popular struggle to achieve positive social change.  It
needs to win over the neutrality, sympathies, opinions, and even
support of an increasingly larger majority of the populace and
involve many of them in the process of opposition and change. 
The central agency of opposition must slowly change from the new
wave activists and groups to the great majority of nonpolitical
populace, the PPOs, and the mainstream political forces as they
are convinced to agree with the movement's position.  The
majority stage is a long process of eroding the social,
political, and economic supports that enable the powerholders to
continue their policies.  It is a slow process of social
transformation that create a new social and political consensus,
reversing those of normal times.

Although movements need to organize both nationally and locally,
they are only as powerful as the power of their grassroots.  All
the national offices in Washington, D.C., can do is "cash in" on
the social and political gains created at the community level all
over the country.  The movement's chief goal, therefore, is to
nurture, support, and empower grassroots activists and groups. 
Finally, activists also need to have a grand strategy for waging 
Stage Six majority movements to win positive social changes
against the strong opposition of the powerholders.


The opposition needs to wage a Stage Six strategy.  Too often
strategy has meant a calendar of events, an assorted number of
unconnected campaigns, and reactions to new governmental
policies.  A Stage Six strategy includes a set of strategic
programs, new organizational and leadership models, and an
overall grand strategy.

Strategic Programs

  *  Ongoing low-intensity local organizing.  The key to Stage
     Six success ultimately is the ongoing, day-in and day-out
     basic efforts of grassroots local activists--public
     speaking, information tables at supermarkets, leafletting,
     yard sales, and so on--all involving face-to-face education
     of citizens by their peers and keeping the issue before the

  *  Massive public education and conversion.  The basic purpose
     of the movement in this stage is to educate, convert, and
     involve all segments of the population.  This is
     accomplished through a broad variety of means, including the
     mass media.  Most important, however, are direct contacts
     through the low-intensity activities at the local level,
     through sidewalk tables, demonstrations, leaflets,
     petitions, housemeetings, literature, and bumper stickers. 
     The issue needs to be re-defined to show how it directly
     affects everyone's values and self-interests and what they
     can do about it.

  *  Build a broad-based pluralized movement.  The movement needs
     to include all segments of the population through
     coalitions, networks, co-sponsorship of events and
     petitions, and directly involving all constituency groups,
     for example, unemployed, Blacks, workers, teachers,
     Hispanics, religious, women, students, etc.  This includes
     movement organizations within each constituency such as
     Women for Peace and Teachers for Social Responsibility.  In
     addition, the movement needs groups in all three categories-
     -professional opposition organizations, new wave
     grassroots, and principled dissent.  The different movement
     organizations must be allies with each other, overcoming the
     tendency towards self-righteousness, anti-mosity, and

  *  Renewed use of mainstream political and social institutions. 
     As the movement wins larger majorities of public opinion,
     mainstream channels (e.g., Congress, city councils,
     officials, election campaigns, candidates, courts, official
     commissions and hearings, and ballot referenda) are used
     with increasing effectiveness.  While they serve to build
     the movement--keeping the issue in the public spotlight,
     educating the public, and so on--they also win actual
     victories on demands where there is big public support in
     places where the movement is strongest and the central
     powerholders weakest, often at the local and state levels. 
     These successes serve to build the movement's success from
     the ground up over the coming years.  For example, the
     opposition to U.S. direct military invasion of Nicaragua has
     been (at least temporarily) successful at the Congressional
     level, but not at the central powerholder level of the
     Reagan administration.  And nuclear energy plans have been
     halted at the local and state levels, while the central
     government and nuclear industry maintain their policies
     favoring increased use of nuclear power.  Also, the
     opposition to nuclear weapons has been built into a national
     consensus, which is putting enormous pressure on the
     national government.   Even President Reagan has tried to
     appear to be ending nuclear weapons, especially U.S.
     missiles in Europe, where there is overwhelming public

  *  Nonviolent rallies, demonstrations, and campaigns,
     especially at critical times and places.  Although the
     movement now includes a wide range of programs, it must
     continue to have nonviolent actions, rallies, and campaigns,
     with occasional civil disobedience.  While nonviolent
     actions should be held at traditional times and places, such
     as on Hiroshima and Nagasaki days, they should also occur at
     critical times and places, such as when Congress votes on
     aid to the contras, when dictators visit, and during re-
     trigger events, such as the Chernobyl accident.  Because
     people are involved in so many different programs in this
     stage, and many no longer see the purpose of some nonviolent
     actions, the numbers participating in any specific national
     or local demonstration usually drop below those of the take-
     off stage (with the exception of some new crises).  However,
     because there are nonviolent actions happening in hundreds
     of local communities around the country when movements are
     in the majority stage, the nationwide total number
     participating in demonstrations actually increases
     enormously in this stage.

     Although nonviolent actions sometimes do help win immediate
     successes, such as change a city council members or
     Congressperson's vote, their chief purpose is to help
     achieve many of the goals of Stages Four to Six, such as
     keeping the issue in the public spotlight and providing a
     platform for the movement to educate the public.

  *  Citizen involvement programs.  the movement needs to develop
     programs in which large numbers of common citizens can
     become actively involved in programs that challenge current
     traditions, policies, and laws, while simultaneously
     carrying out the society's values and the movement's
     alternatives.  This empowers the movement and citizens
     because they can carry out their values and goals without
     waiting for the powerholders to make the decision for them. 
     This is quite different form isolated alternative
     "demonstration" projects.  Citizen involvement programs put
     large numbers of people directly in contradiction with
     official policies.  Some excellent massive citizen
     involvement programs of today's movements include the
     sanctuary movement, in which local churches and towns
     throughout the country provide official sanctuary for
     Central American political refugees; the thousands of
     "citizen diplomats" traveling to Russia and Nicaragua;
     sending tools and aid to Nicaragua in violation of U.S.
     sanctions; and nuclear free towns, counties, and even
     countries, such as New Zealand and Palau.  These programs
     educate and convert the public, demonstrate the alternative
     values and policies sought, demonstrate the extent of
     popular opposition, undercut the authority of the
     powerholders to carry out their policy goals, and build
     change from the bottom up.

  *  Respond to new trigger events, such as the Three-Mile Island
     and Chernobyl accidents, to again put the issue in the
     public spotlight, educate the public to new levels of
     awareness, build the movement organizations, and increase
     the pressure for change.

New empowerment organization and leadership model

Movement organizations must switch from the "loose" to the
"empowerment" model.  The loose organization model was highly
appropriate at the beginning of the new movement.  It allowed for
creative, spontaneous activities, which included civil
disobedience and quick, flexible, and direct decision-making by
all involved.  But after six months the loose structure rapidly
becomes a liability.  It becomes too inefficient, people burn out
from long meetings, the most experienced and strongest activists
become dominant leaders, new people have difficulty becoming full
participants, and the whole organization evolves into a informal
hierarchy.  The empowerment organization model is the name given
to a new structure that activists must construct themselves, in
which they try to maximize the advantages and minimize the
disadvantages of the hierarchical and loose models.  Its goal is
to be participatory democratic, efficient, flexible, and capable
of lasting over the long haul.  This requires more structures,
but structures that assure these principles.

This is a critical time for the offices and staff of national
movement organizations.  While they need to advocate practical
policies of "real politics", maintain the organization, and
operate in bureaucracies (no matter how "collective"), they must
prevent the organization from becoming a new POO, and the staff
from becoming new movement elites.  The primary goal is to serve,
nurture, and empower the grassroots and to ensure that internal
participatory democracy is carried out.  The staff model must
continue to be that of nurturing mothers, not dominant
patriarchs.  When the national staff behaves as if they are the
movement, the grassroots dries up and the movement loses its

Grand Strategy

Activists need to develop a "grand strategy" for waging social
movements in Stage Six.  Lacking a viable strategy, most
activists are unable to see a relationship between their day-to-
day activities and the accomplishment of the movement's goals. 
Some of the key elements are the following:

  *  Keep the issue in the public spotlight and on society's
     agenda over time.  Keep the policies and conditions which
     violate the values, interests, and beliefs of the majority
     of the populace in the public spotlight.  Over time, this
     helps build the social and political conditions for change
     because it helps fulfill Robert Jay Lifton's view that the
     way to get rid of a social delusion is to keep telling the
     truth.  The present social movements against nuclear weapons
     and in opposition to U.S. intervention in Central America
     should recognize as tremendous success the fact that these
     issues have been kept in the public spotlight and on
     society's social and political agendas for a number of

  *  Identify all of the movement's key goals and identify which
     stage each is in and develop strategies to achieve them. 
     Identify the movement's full range of demands, from the very
     specific to the general, such as end all nuclear weapons,
     stop nuclear testing, stop Star Wars, and stop U.S.
     Euromissiles.  Strategies, submovements, and campaigns need
     to be developed for each of these major demands.  Activists
     should identify which MAP stage the movement is in for each
     of these demands and develop strategies, submovements, and
     campaigns to achieve each major demand.  For example, stop
     U.S. direct invasion of Nicaragua might be in Stage Seven,
     official support for the contras in Stage Six, and a
     positive Contadora peace resolution for all of Central
     America is possibly just in Stage Three.

  *  Counter the powerholders' strategy.  The movement needs to
     identify the powerholders' long-term goals, strategies, and
     programs and develop counter-strategies against each one. 
     For example, the U.S. is considering invading Nicaragua,
     supporting the contra's war against Nicaragua, preventing a
     meaningful peaceful Contadora resolution, etc.  The movement
     needs to develop campaigns to prevent the government's
     achieving each of these objectives.

  *  Beyond reforms:  propose alternatives, larger demands, and a
     new paradigm.  The movement now needs not only to protest
     present policies but also to propose specific alternatives. 
     In the process of struggle, people act their way into
     thinking, and they learn that the problem is much bigger
     than they had thought.  They come to realize that their
     original concerns were merely symptoms of much bigger and
     deeper problems; consequently, the movement needs to make
     larger demands.  This ultimately includes the necessity for
     a whole new worldview or paradigm.  The movement against
     Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe, for example,
     realized that they needed to remove all nuclear weapons from
     East and West Europe.  This has led a new worldview of a
     nuclear free East and West Europe that will become
     increasingly neutral and independent of the Soviet-United
     States superpower bloc system.

  *  Guide the movement through the dynamics of conflict with the
     powerholders.  Waging a social movement is similar to
     playing chess.  The movement and powerholders constantly
     engage in moves and countermoves to win the public and build
     conditions to support their own position.  The movement
     tries to build moral, political, and economic conditions
     that will erode the support that enables the powerholders to
     continue their policies.  The powerholders keep changing
     their policies to keep their capacity to maintain the status
     quo.  The movement's goal is to keep weakening the
     powerholders' position and raising the price that they must
     pay to continue their policies.  The Reagan administration,
     for example, seemed about to invade Nicaragua in 1984, but
     the anti-intervention movement raised public opposition to a
     new level.  The government then switched its chief focus to
     supporting the contras, but the movement made this illegal
     by helping pass the Boland amendment, thereby forcing the
     government to undertake the high-risk policies of illegal
     and unconstitutional covert aid through Ollie North.  This
     has weakened President Reagan's capacity to wage his
     policies in Central America as well as elsewhere.


The powerholders launch a hardline conflict management strategy
to defend their policies, which included the following:

  *  Promote new rhetoric and myths and re-emphasize the threat
     of outside demons, such as terrorism and Communism, to try
     to rally an increasingly skeptical public.

  *  Increase their counter-movement strategy to gather
     intelligence; discredit the movement; cause internal
     disruption, control, and steer the movement; preempt it by
     claiming to do the movement's program (e.g., "Star Wars will
     end nuclear weapons"); and try to co-opt the movement under
     mainstream political control (e.g., co-sponsor grossly
     watered down Congressional bills).

  *  Engage in the dynamics of conflict with the movement by
     switching strategies, stance, and policies as needed, for
     example, from invading Nicaragua with U.S. troops, to
     supporting the proxy contras and waging low-intensity
     warfare against Nicaragua.

  *  Publicly appear to be engaged in a meaningful "negotiation
     process", while actually carrying out operative policies and
     doctrines without giving up any important advantages.

Powerholders keep pronouncing that their policies are correct and
winning.  Finally, splits begin happening within the power
structure, as over time pressure from the new social and
political consensus force increasing portions of the mainstream
political, economic and social elites to switch their position,
even openly oppose the policies of the central powerholders in
order to protect their own self-interests.  The issue is now
hotly contested within Congress, the Administration, and all
other political levels.

Public Opinion

Public opinion opposing the powerholders' policies grows to as
much as 65 percent within a few years, and then, over many years,
slowly swells to a large majority of up to 85 percent.  The
populace, however, is evenly splitover wanting a change in the
status quo.  Half fears the alternatives more than they oppose
the present conditions and policies.  By the early 1970s, for
example, 83 percent of Americans called for an end to the Vietnam
war, and currently 65 percent oppose aid to the contras and U.S.
military intervention in Central America.


  *  Keep the issue and the powerholders' values violations in
     the public spotlight and on society's agenda.

  *  Switch from only crisis protest to waging protracted social
     struggle to achieve positive social change.

  *  Gear efforts to the public to keep winning a bigger majority

  *  Involve large numbers of the populace in programs at the
     grassroots level.

  *  Propose alternatives, more demands, and a new paradigm.

  *  Have activists able to use a strategic framework such as

  *  Adopt empowerment organizational and leadership models.


  *  Activists become stuck in the protest stage.

  *  Movement violence, rebelliousness, and macho radicalism.

  *  Believing that the movement is losing and local efforts are

  *  National organizations and leadership disenfranchise
     grassroots activists by dominating the movement.

  *  Cooptation by powerholders through collusion and compromise.

  *  Political sects dominate the movement organizations.


Over many years, perhaps decades, public opinion against the
powerholders' policies swells to an overwhelming majority of up
to 85 percent, as was opposition to the Vietnam War.  Almost
every sector of society eventually wants to end the problem and
current policies--most politicians, the Democratic Party,
celebrities, professionals, students, Middle America, youth, the
unemployed, local governments, and the general population.  But
strangely, nothing seems to change.  The problem continues,
Congress seems unable to make decisive votes, and the central
powerholders continue their policies, although with cosmetic
changes.  Moreover the movement appears to be in a lull.  There
are demonstrations, meetings, and activists, but they seem
small, routine, and mechanical, as the movement's position has
been adopted by the mainstream of society.  Over the years,
however, the weight of the massive public opposition, along with
the defection of many elites, eventually takes its toll.  The
political price that the powerholders have to pay to maintain
their policies grows to become an untenable liability.

                    Stage Six:  1979 to 1992

From 1979 to 1987, the anti-nuclear energy movement has been
progressing in the majority opposition stage.  Public opinion
against nuclear energy keeps growing bigger.  Seventy-eight
percent of Americans now oppose building more reactors, and many
local and state officials fight against starting up even
completed local reactors and proposed waste sites.  Similar
majorities exist in Europe, where 50 percent of citizens favor
shutting down operating plants.

The nuclear industry continued in sharp decline.  Although the
number of licensed reactors has increased to 98, the total number
of reactors operating and under construction has dropped from 195
to 123.  There have been no effective new orders for 14 years,
and over 100 reactors orders have been cancelled--even ones that
are 50 percent complete.  The secrets of the powerholders'
operative nuclear energy policies are now known by many citizens. 
Nuclear energy is outrageously expensive, dangerous, and
unnecessary;  and it is tied to nuclear weapons, which many
people oppose.  Trigger events such as the Three Mile Island and
Chernobyle accidents have also spurred public opposition.  If the
present trend of no new orders and reactor cancellations
continues, nuclear energy will die out early in the next century
as existing reactors come to the end of their 25-year life

The federal government, both political parties, and the nuclear
industry still promote nuclear energy and want hundreds of
operating reactors by the year 2000.  The federal bureaucracy,
for example, subsidized nuclear energy through tax breaks and
outlays amounting to $56 billion in 1984 alone.  Also, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is now trying to drop its
rule requiring local government involvement in establishing
emergency evacuation plans as a prerequisite for reactor
licensing.  The NRC is attempting this because the local and
state governments are preventing the licensing of the completed
Shoreham and Seabrook reactors by refusing to be part of the
evacuation plans.
The pro-nuclear strategy now is to streamline licensing nuclear
into one easy step, develop new light-water reactors, respond
positively to new accidents, develop a social and political
consensus through propaganda, bail out threatened reactors, open
waste sites, deregulate the utilities, develop space weapons that
use lots of nuclear reactors, and regionalize electrical
production to get around state controls.  The anti-nuclear
strategy is to educate the public, respond to new trigger events
with demonstrations and education, and counter the pro-nuclear
strategies of saving the nuclear industry by opposing rate hikes,
bailouts, rule changes, and so on.  For example, the movement is
presently challenging the NRC's proposed changes in its
evacuation plan rules which would permit the Seabrook and
Shoreham reactors to become fully licensed.  In addition, the
movement is advocating the new soft-energy path of conservation,
cogeneration, and solar power to replace the hard-energy path.  
Much of the movement's efforts are now being waged by POOs and
local groups using the mainstream institutions and channels, such
as the courts, state utilities, legislation, referenda, and
electoral politics.

                      STAGE SEVEN:  SUCCESS

Stage Seven begins when the long process of building opposition
reaches a new plateau in which the new social consensus turns the
tide of power against the powerholders and begins an endgame
process leading to the movement's success.  The Stage Seven
process can take three forms:  dramatic showdown, quiet showdown,
or attrition.

  *  Dramatic showdown resembles the take off stage.  A sudden
     trigger event sparks a mobilization of broad popular
     opposition and a social crisis, but this time the
     overwhelming coercive force, in a relatively short time,
     changes policies or leadership.  This was achieved in each
     issue of the early 1960s civil rights movement, such as when
     the Selma march started President Johnson and the Congress
     into motion that led to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 within
     a few months.  Activists usually feel that they won and had
     played an important role in achieving success.

  *  Quiet showdown.  Realizing that they can no longer continue
     their present policies, the powerholders launch a face-
     saving endgame process of "victorious retreat".  Rather than
     admit defeat, they proclaim victory and start a publicly
     recognized process of changing their policies and conditions
     to those demanded by the movement and social consensus.  The
     powerholders try to take credit for this "victory", even
     though they were forced to reverse their previously hardline
     policies, while activists often have difficulty seeing their
     role in this success.  A current example is President
     Reagan's efforts to reach an agreement with Gorbachev to end

  *  Attrition is when success is quietly and seemingly invisibly
     achieved in a long process which could take decades, in
     which social and political machinery slowly evolves new
     policies and conditions, such as the present winding down of
     nuclear energy in the United States.  During the attrition
     process, activists usually have even more difficulty
     recognizing the successful endgame process and the fact that
     they had a crucial role in causing it.  In all three forms,
     once the endgame process starts, final success is not
     guaranteed.  Until the change is finally actually
     accomplished, the situation can be reversed.  Stage Seven
     involves a continual struggle, but one in which the
     opposition is on the offensive until the specific goal is


The chief engine for change switches from the "movement" to
traditional progressives; the "nonpolitical" majority of the
population; and mainstream political, social, and economic groups
and institutions.  The public becomes involved in a broad range
of social actions which keep the spotlight on the issues, reveals
the evils of the present policies , and creates real political
and economic penalties.  Most of the business and political
powerholders are forced to defect from their ties to the status
quo, because it is in their self-interest.  The penalty for
defending the status quo has become bigger than for accepting the
alternative.  The politicians will face hostile voters at their
next election, and the business community can suffer loss of
profits or business community can suffer loss of profits or
business through boycotts, sanctions, and disruption of the
marketplace.  There sometimes is a general, worldwide
insurrection which isolates the central powerholders and their
dwindling support.

The opposition's efforts and feelings vary according to the
endgame form:

  *  In dramatic showdown, the movement more resembles the take-
     off stage, in which it plays a massive, publicly obvious
     role involving mass-demonstrations in a time of crisis
     leading to success in a relatively short time, such as the
     toppling of Marcos, following the election process, or the
     achievement of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, five months after
     the Selma campaign.

  *  In quiet showdown, the movement continues its strategy and
     programs of both take-off and Stage Six, and while still
     publicly active, activists  need to work hard to recognize
     the victory and their own role.

  *  In Attrition, the endgame process is often not recognized as
     success, the movement's role is much less visible, and much
     of the opposition's efforts are carried out through the work
     of elites and the POOs.


The viability of the central powerholders' policies is eroded
economically and politically.  The majority of powerholders join
the opposition view, while the central powerholders are isolated
and eventually defeated.  The central powerholders are:

  *  forced into making fatal mistakes, such as President Nixon's
     ordered Watergate break-ins and other "dirty tricks" against
     the opposition, or when President Reagan felt forced to
     violate the Boland amendment through illegal covert aid to
     the contras;

  *  increasingly prevented from doing what is fully required to
     successfully carry out their policies, such as when the
     Pentagon was prevented from carrying out programs it felt
     were necessary to win the Vietnam War; and

  *  resort extreme emergency acts of political and economic
     decrees and repression, which serve only to spur the
     opposition.  The economic, social, and political penalties
     erode the base for support of the powerholders to either
     continue their policies or remain in office.

The central powerholders have three different endgame strategies,
according to the type of ending:

  *  Custer's last stand (in dramatic showdown), in which they
     hold out until either their policies are defeated in the
     mainstream political process, such as in the courts,
     Congress, or referenda, or they lose their office or
     position through elections or mass social actions and

  *  victorious retreat (in quiet showdown), in which the
     powerholders lose on the issue, but in reversing their
     policies declare victory for themselves; or of

  *  Persistent stubbornness (in attrition), in which they hold 
     out in an increasingly losing cause over many years, until
     one of the above two endings occur.


The public demands change.  The opposition to the powerholders
is now so overwhelming that the whole issue is publicly
recognized as the "good guys vs. bad guys".  One is either for
decency or for President Marcos, apartheid, and the Vietnam War. 
While a majority opposition has existed for some years, up to now
the mass population was not willing to act on their beliefs. 
They had not acted because they:

  *  felt powerless,

  *  did not know what to do,

  *  were not called to action by a trigger event and crisis, and

  *  feared the alternative (e.g., Communism, or the unknown)
     more than they desired change.

Citizens are so repulsed that their desire to end present
policies and conditions overtakes their worry about the
consequences of the alternative.

They are ready to vote, demonstrate, and even support the
central powerholders in changing present policies.  For example,
people want an end to nuclear weapons more than they fear Soviet
attack and takeover.


The movement's goals for this stage include:

  *  Wage a successful "endgame" strategy to achieve one or more

  *  Have activists recognize the success and their own role in

  *  Raise larger issues and propose alternative paradigms.

  *  Create new decentralized centers of power based on more
     participatory structures and an empowered public.

  *  Continue the movement.


The movement needs to avoid:

  *  compromising too many values and key demands;

  *  achieving minor reforms without building toward basic social

  *  having activists feel dismayed and powerless because they do
     not recognize success and the movement's role in a
     successful endgame; and

  *  having apparent final victory end the movement.


The movement finally achieves one or more of its demands.  It now
needs to address some hard questions:  What is success?  What
needs to be done next?  The movement needs to recognize successes
achieved, follow up on the demands won, raise larger issues,
focus on other demands which are in various stages, and propose
larger alternatives and a new paradigm.

                     Stage Seven:  1993 Plus

The anti-nuclear energy movement can win either by attrition or
dramatic showdown.  If present trends continue, nuclear energy
will end slowly by prolonged decline of attrition early in the
next century as described in the previous stage.  This will
require continuous opposition by the movement to the public and
private powerholders' attempts to revive the industry through
government institutions.  The central powerholders will continue
to promote nuclear energy until nuclear energy becomes completely
untenable economically or political, or until they lose office.

On the other hand, nuclear energy could come to a dramatic
showdown ending as the result of a major nuclear accident as in
the following scenario:  In the Summer of 1993, an accident (some
think it was the first act of terrorism within the United States)
at a nuclear plant located in a densely populated metropolitan
area in Northeast causes devastation far greater than that of
Chernobyl.  All nuclear plants in the U.S. are ordered shut down
pending an investigation.  The fate of nuclear energy is at the
top of the nation's agenda for the next fifteen months.  Eighty-
five percent of Americans oppose the restart of the reactors. 
Finally, just before its end-of-the-year break, Congress votes to
end nuclear energy.

Both of these success options require that the general populace
understands and accepts an alternative means for meeting the
nation's electrical energy needs.  By that time, the movement
must have educated and convinced the populace that the nation can
switch to the soft energy paradigm.


The success achieved in Stage Seven is not the end of the
struggle but a basis for continuing that struggle and creating
new beginnings.


The movement has to continue the struggle in five different ways:

  *  Celebrate success.  The successes of Stage Seven and the
     movement's role in achieving them should be clearly
     recognized by activists.

  *  Follow-up.  There needs to be follow-up, mainly by the
     POOs, at the local and national level (1) to make sure that
     the new promises, laws, and policies are actually carried
     out (e.g., after the 1965 Voting Rights Act a major effort
     was required to assure that Blacks were actually allowed to
     vote); (2) to achieve additional successes, which are now
     possible under the new political conditions and legal
     mandate; and (3) to resist backlash which might reverse the
     new gains.

  *  Work on achieving other demands.  The movement needs to
     focus on achieving other demands, which are probably in
     earlier MAP stages.  After the civil rights movement
     desegregated restaurants in 1960, for example, the whole MAP
     stages process was repeated with successive movements to
     achieve integrated buses, equal public accommodations,
     voting rights, and work to end poverty.

  *  New social consciousness, issues, and movements.  The modern
     student and women's movements emerged out of the civil
     rights and anti-Vietnam War movements.

  *  Beyond reform to social change.  Social movements need to go
     beyond immediate reforms to build toward fundamental
     structural changes by (1) creating empowered people who
     become life-long social change agents, and not just one-
     issue protesters; (2) creating ongoing grassroots political
     organizations and networks; (3) broadening the analysis,
     issues, and goals of movements; (4) propose new alternatives
     and worldviews or paradigms that put forward new political
     and social systems, not just oppose symptoms.


Governmental bureaucracies are supposed to carry out new laws and
directives but could drag their feet and even fail to follow
through.  While most powerholders will be part of the new social
and political consensus and try to carry out the new laws and
policies, some may counterattack to reverse the new successes, as
the Reagan administration did in ignoring the Boland amendment
and continuing its support of the contras after 1984.


A new social consensus of about 80 percent of the populace
supports the favorable resolution of the movement's demand and
the resulting new policies and conditions.  The new demands on
which the movement now begins focusing are supported by between
10 and 80 percent of the public and are different MAP stages.


The movement's goals are to assure that the demands achieved are
maintained and to circle back to focus the movement on other


The chief hazards of Stage Eight are having the new successes
either inadequately implemented or revoked from backlash.


There is no end.  There is only the continuing struggle, acted
out in cycles of social movements.  The process of winning one
set of demands creates new levels of citizen consciousness and
empowerment, and generates new movements on new demands and

Peoples' movements move the world further along the path towards
more fully meeting the spiritual, physical, social, and political
needs of humanity.  Moreover, the very process of being fully
involved in the struggle of peoples' movements contributes to
peoples' political and spiritual fulfillment.  Activists are part
of the emerging people-power movements around the world.  People
worldwide are struggling to transform themselves and the world
from the present era of superpowers, materialism, environmental
breakdown, disenfranchisement, abject poverty amidst opulence,
and militarism, to a new, more human era of democracy, freedom,
justice, self-determination, human rights, peaceful coexistence,
preservation of the environment, and the meeting of basic human

Consequently, the long-term impacts are more important than their
immediate successes.  The civil rights movement, for example,
created a new positive image of Blacks among themselves and
whites, established nonviolent action as a means to achieve
people power, directly spun off the student and anti-Vietnam War
movements, and inspired peoples' movements got the American
people, for the first time, to challenge and change American
foreign policy and created the "Vietnam syndrome" in which the
American people oppose the century old policy of U.S. military
intervention in Latin America to achieve the interests of
American powerholders.  Social movements are also contagious: 
Philippines people's movement spurred similar efforts in Haiti,
Chile, and now South Korea.

                   Stage Eight:  Through 2025

If the nuclear energy endgame is that of attrition, the movement
will have to continue its vigilance and opposition indefinitely
into the future, opposing the barrage of central powerholder
efforts to revive the nuclear energy era, until there is a total
social and political consensus for cancelling nuclear energy and
switching to a soft energy path.  On the other hand, the dramatic
showdown scenario could go as follows:  The industrialized world
is rocked again in 1995 by the report of an international
commission that was set up following the 1993 accident to predict
the world's energy future into the next century.  Its findings
went far beyond the nuclear energy issue.  The study included
many of the coming crises that had been documented over the past
30 years.  It showed that the current rates of fossil fuel (oil,
wood, and coal) energy production would cause many catastrophes
by the year 2025.  The greenhouse effect would raise the Earth's
temperature reducing the agricultural production and creating the
loss of many coastlines from the melting of glacial ice; the
Earth's ozone layer would be reduced, causing hundreds of
millions of additional skin cancers; forests would be devastated
by acid rain; the oceans would be threatened; and the world's
production of oil would peak and drop by 50 percent, as the
available oil sources dry up, and oil production over the next
five years would drop while prices skyrocketed.

Nations throughout the world hastily turn away from the hard
energy policies based on high consumption of nuclear and fossil
fuels and begin crash efforts to adopt soft energy strategies.